David Wood’s Islamic Dilemma: Reflections

Conversations between Christians and Muslims often circle around a familiar set of questions: What does the Qur’an say about earlier scriptures? How reliable is the Bible? And what happens when the two traditions make competing claims?

One argument that regularly surfaces in these discussions is David Wood’s “Islamic Dilemma.” It’s simple, provocative, and easy to explain — which is exactly why it gets so much attention.

David Wood is an American Christian philosopher and apologist known for his debates with Muslim scholars and his critiques of Islamic theology. He co‑founded Acts 17 Apologetics and became widely recognized through public debates and online content engaging with Islamic claims. 

Wood is also known for his long, formative friendship with Nabeel Qureshi — a relationship that began in university as intellectual sparring partners and grew into a deep personal bond that shaped both of their journeys in apologetics.

This post is about unpacking the Islamic Dilemma argument, looking at how Muslim scholars respond, and reflecting on how da’wah (Islamic outreach) often presents the issue to the public.

What Is the “Islamic Dilemma”?

David Wood’s argument rests on two observations.

1. The Qur’an speaks positively about the Torah and the Gospel.

Examples include:

• Qur’an 3:3–4 — God revealed the Torah and the Gospel as guidance and light.
• Qur’an 5:47 — Christians are told to “judge by what God revealed in the Gospel.”
• Qur’an 10:94 — Muhammad is told that if he is in doubt, he should ask those who read earlier scripture.

These verses appear to affirm the authority of the scriptures available in the 7th century.

2. But the Bible contradicts Islamic teachings.

For example:

• Jesus’ crucifixion
  Affirmed throughout the New Testament (e.g., Mark 15, Luke 23, John 19)
  Explicitly denied in Qur’an 4:157
• Jesus’ divine identity
  Affirmed in John 1:1, John 20:28, Colossians 1:15–20
  Rejected in Qur’an 5:72 and Qur’an 112:1–4
• Jesus as the Son of God
  Central in Matthew 3:17 and John 3:16
  Denied in Qur’an 19:35 and Qur’an 5:116

From this, Wood frames the dilemma:

If the Bible is reliable, Islam contradicts it.
If the Bible is corrupted, the Qur’an is wrong for affirming it.

How Muslim Scholars Respond

Muslim scholars offer several responses, each grounded in a different interpretive approach. And importantly, many Muslims find these rebuttals compelling because their worldview prioritizes revelation as the highest source of truth. In this framework, God’s speech defines reality, and empirical evidence is interpreted through that lens.

This difference in starting point is crucial for understanding why the same argument can look strong from one perspective and weak from another.

1. “The Qur’an affirms the original revelations, not the later texts.”

In this view, the Qur’an praises the original Torah and Gospel — the revelations given to Moses and Jesus — not necessarily the versions circulating in late antiquity.

Within a revelation-first worldview:
If God revealed earlier scriptures, then those revelations must have been true. Whether surviving manuscripts match them is a secondary question.

From an empirical worldview:
Verses like Qur’an 5:47 and 10:94 appear to refer to the scriptures available in Muhammad’s time, creating tension with the “lost originals” idea.

2. “The Qur’an praises the moral guidance of earlier scriptures, not their doctrines.”

This interpretation says the Qur’an affirms the ethical teachings of earlier books — justice, charity, monotheism — without endorsing every theological claim.

Within a revelation-first worldview:
It preserves Qur’anic authority while explaining doctrinal differences.

From an empirical worldview:
Some verses (e.g., Qur’an 5:68) seem broader than ethics alone, making this reading feel narrow.

3. “The Bible was textually corrupted before Islam.”

This is the most common da’wah response.

Within a revelation-first worldview:
The Qur’an criticizes earlier communities for distorting their message (e.g., Qur’an 2:75, 4:46), so corruption feels like a natural conclusion.

From an empirical worldview:
Manuscripts from the 2nd–4th centuries match today’s New Testament closely. The Qur’an never explicitly says the text was altered. No historical evidence shows a major rewrite.

Where Da’wah Apologetics Complicate Things

Many da’wah speakers (equivalent to evangelists) confidently assert:

• “The Bible was changed.”
• “The original Gospel is lost.”
• “Christians corrupted their scripture.”

But they rarely mention:

• The thousands of early manuscripts
• The textual stability of the New Testament was well established by the time the Qur'an was compiled
• That the Qur’an’s criticism focuses on interpretation, not textual alteration
• That many Muslim academics reject the popular da’wah narrative

Because revelation is prioritized over empirical evidence, these omissions often don’t feel like omissions within the da’wah mindset. But the practical effect is that audiences walk away with a distorted picture of the historical data.

How Worldview Shapes the Strength of the Dilemma

The strength of the “Islamic Dilemma” depends entirely on the worldview one brings to it.

From an empirical worldview:

• Manuscript evidence matters.
• Historical continuity matters.
• Claims of textual corruption are weak.
• Qur’anic affirmations of earlier scripture create real tension.

From a revelation-first worldview:

• Revelation is the highest authority.
• God’s word defines truth, not manuscripts.
• Qur’anic statements are interpreted through that lens.
• Empirical evidence is secondary or reinterpreted.

Christian worldviews and Muslim worldviews operate with different foundations, and those foundations determine which arguments feel strong and which feel strained.

Across Catholic, Orthodox, and most Protestant traditions, there’s a shared conviction:

If God is the author of both revelation and the natural world, then the two cannot ultimately contradict.

This is a deep, historic Christian intuition.
It goes back to Augustine, Aquinas, the Reformers, and modern theologians alike.

So yes — the expectation is that:

• theological truth
• historical truth
• scientific truth
• empirical truth

…should ultimately align.

If they appear to conflict, Christians typically assume:

• our interpretation of Scripture is incomplete, or
• our interpretation of the evidence is incomplete, or
• we’re missing a piece that will eventually bring the two into harmony.

This is not a fringe view — it’s the dominant Christian posture.

In mainstream Islam, the assumption is:

God’s revelation is perfect, final, and unchanging.
Therefore, if empirical evidence appears to conflict with revelation, the evidence or its interpretation must be flawed.

This is not fringe. It’s built into the structure of Islamic theology:

• The Qur’an is the literal speech of God.
• It is preserved perfectly.
• It is the ultimate criterion for truth.
• Human reasoning and empirical inquiry are valuable, but subordinate.

So yes — Muslims expect harmony.

But the harmony is achieved by interpreting the world through revelation, not by adjusting revelation to fit the world.

Quite different from the Christian worldview.

Final Thoughts

Considering the two points of view is about understanding how different worldviews — one grounded primarily in revelation, the other in empirical evidence — evaluate the same claims in different ways.

A position can appear compelling from one angle and unconvincing from another. Recognizing that difference is essential for clearer, more constructive conversations about scripture, history, and faith.

Keeping religion completely private

Tim Keller

Just read this insightful piece by Tim Keller from his book "The Reason for God":

Another approach to the divisiveness of religion is to allow that people may privately believe their faith is the truth and may “evangelize” for their faith, but that religious beliefs should be kept out of the public sphere. Influential thinkers such as John Rawls and Robert Audi have argued that, in public political discussions, we may not argue for a moral position unless it has a secular, nonreligious grounding. Rawls is well known for insisting that what he calls “comprehensive” religious views be excluded from public discourse.[i] Recently a large array of scientists and philosophers signed “A Declaration in Defense of Science and Secularism,” which called on the leaders of our government “not to permit legislation or executive action to be influenced by religious beliefs.”[ii] The signers included Peter Singer, E. O. Wilson, and Daniel C. Dennett. The philosopher Richard Rorty, for example, has argued that religious faith must remain a strictly private affair and must never be brought into discussions of public policy. To ever use an argument grounded in a religious belief is simply a “conversation stopper,” which the nonbeliever cannot engage.[iii]

To those who complain that this approach discriminates against religion, Rorty and others retort that this policy is simply pragmatic.[iv] They are not ideologically opposed to religion per se, nor are they seeking to control religious beliefs, so long as they are kept in the private sphere. However, in the public square it is divisive and time-consuming to argue constantly over religion. Religion-based positions are seen as sectarian and controversial, while secular reasoning for moral positions are seen as universal and available to all. Therefore, public discourse should be secular, never religious. Without reference to any divine revelation or confessional tradition, we should work together on the great problems of our time—such as AIDS, poverty, education, and so on. We should keep our religious views to ourselves and unite around policies that “work” best for the most people.

However, Stephen L. Carter of Yale responds that it is impossible to leave religious views behind when we do any kind of moral reasoning at all.

Efforts to craft a public square from which religious conversation is absent, no matter how thoughtfully worked out, will always in the end say to those of organized religion that they alone, unlike everybody else, must enter public dialogue only after leaving behind that part of themselves that they may consider the most vital.[v]

How can Carter make such a claim? Let’s begin by asking what religion is. Some say it is a form of belief in God. But that would not fit Zen Buddhism, which does not really believe in God at all. Some say it is belief in the supernatural. But that does not fit Hinduism, which does not believe in a supernatural realm beyond the material world, but only a spiritual reality within the empirical. What is religion then? It is a set of beliefs that explain what life is all about, who we are, and the most important things that human beings should spend their time doing. For example, some think that this material world is all there is, that we are here by accident and when we die we just rot, and therefore the important thing is to choose to do what makes you happy and not let others impose their beliefs on you. Notice that though this is not an explicit, “organized” religion, it contains a master narrative, an account about the meaning of life along with a recommendation for how to live based on that account of things.

Some call this a “worldview” while others call it a “narrative identity.” In either case it is a set of faith-assumptions about the nature of things. It is an implicit religion. Broadly understood, faith in some view of the world and human nature informs everyone’s life. Everyone lives and operates out of some narrative identity, whether it is thought out and reflected upon or not. All who say “You ought to do this” or “You shouldn’t do that” reason out of such an implicit moral and religious position. Pragmatists say that we should leave our deeper worldviews behind and find consensus about “what works”—but our view of what works is determined by (to use a Wendell Berry title) what we think people are for. Any picture of happy human life that “works” is necessarily informed by deep-seated beliefs about the purpose of human life.[vi] Even the most secular pragmatists come to the table with deep commitments and narrative accounts of what it means to be human.

Rorty insists that religion-based beliefs are conversation stoppers. But all of our most fundamental convictions about things are beliefs that are nearly impossible to justify to those who don’t share them. Secular concepts such as “self-realization” and “autonomy” are impossible to prove and are “conversation stoppers” just as much as appeals to the Bible.[vii]

Statements that seem to be common sense to the speakers are nonetheless often profoundly religious in nature. Imagine that Ms. A argues that all the safety nets for the poor should be removed, in the name of “survival of the fittest.” Ms. B might respond, “The poor have the right to a decent standard of living—they are human beings like the rest of us!” Ms. A could then come back with the fact that many bioethicists today think the concept of “human” is artificial and impossible to define. She might continue that there is no possibility of treating all living organisms as ends rather than means and that some always have to die that others may live. That is simply the way nature works. If Ms. B counters with a pragmatic argument, that we should help the poor simply because it makes society work better, Ms. A could come up with many similar pragmatic arguments about why letting some of the poor just die would be even more efficient. Now Ms. B would be getting angry. She would respond heatedly that starving the poor is simply unethical, but Ms. A could retort, “Who says ethics must be the same for everyone?” Ms. B would finally exclaim: “I wouldn’t want to live in a society like the one you are describing!”

In this interchange Ms. B has tried to follow John Rawls and find universally accessible, “neutral and objective” arguments that would convince everyone that we must not starve the poor. She has failed because there are none. In the end Ms. B affirms the equality and dignity of human individuals simply because she believes it is true and right. She takes as an article of faith that people are more valuable than rocks or trees—though she can’t prove such a belief scientifically. Her public policy proposals are ultimately based on a religious stance.[viii]

This leads a legal theorist, Michael J. Perry, to conclude that it is “quixotic, in any event, to attempt to construct an airtight barrier between religiously grounded moral discourse … and [secular] discourse in public political argument.”[ix] Rorty and others argue that religious argument is too controversial, but Perry retorts in Under God? Religious Faith and Liberal Democracy that secular grounds for moral positions are no less controversial than religious grounds, and a very strong case can be made that all moral positions are at least implicitly religious. Ironically, insisting that religious reasoning be excluded from the public square is itself a controversial “sectarian” point of view.[x]

When you come out into the public square it is impossible to leave your convictions about ultimate values behind. Let’s take marriage and divorce laws as a case study. Is it possible to craft laws that we all agree “work” apart from particular worldview commitments? I don’t believe so. Your views of what is right will be based on what you think the purpose of marriage is. If you think marriage is mainly for the rearing of children to benefit the whole society, then you will make divorce very difficult. If you think the purpose of marriage is more primarily for the happiness and emotional fulfillment of the adults who enter it, you will make divorce much easier. The former view is grounded in a view of human flourishing and well-being in which the family is more important than the individual, as is seen in the moral traditions of Confucianism, Judaism, and Christianity. The latter approach is a more individualistic view of human nature based on the Enlightenment’s understanding of things. The divorce laws you think “work” will depend on prior beliefs about what it means to be happy and fully human.[xi] There is no objective, universal consensus about what that is. Although many continue to call for the exclusion of religious views from the public square, increasing numbers of thinkers, both religious and secular, are admitting that such a call is itself religious.[xii]

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[i] Robert Audi, “The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (1989): 296; John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 212–254

[ii] On February 28, 2007, this document could be accessed at http://www.cfidc.org/declaration.html

[iii] Richard Rorty, “Religion as a Conversation-Stopper,” Philosophy and Social Hope (Penguin, 1999), pp. 168–169

[iv] See Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (University of Minnesota Press, 1982) pp. 166–67

[v] Stephen L. Carter, The Dissent of the Governed (Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 90.

[vi] For example, Linda Hirshman makes a case against women staying out of the marketplace to raise children at home. She insists that it is wrong for women to do that even if it is their free, voluntary choice. “The family—with its repetitious, socially invisible, physical tasks—is a necessary part of life, but it allows fewer opportunities for full human flourishing than public spheres like the market or the government. This less-flourishing sphere is not the natural or moral responsibility only of women.… Women assigning it to themselves is … unjust.” (“Homeward Bound,” in The American Prospect 16, no. 12 (December 2005). Notice her argument is based on an assessment of “human flourishing” that could never be empirically proven. It is rooted in views of human dignity and society that on the surface seem secular but are certainly unproveable, controversial, and ultimately based on worldview faith-assumptions. David Brooks takes issue with Hirshman: “[She asserts] that high-paying jobs lead to more human flourishing than parenthood. Look back over your life. Which memories do you cherish more, those with your family or those at the office?” See “The Year of Domesticity,” New York Times, January 1, 2006

[vii] Gary Rosen, “Narrowing the Religion Gap?” New York Times Sunday Magazine, February 18, 2007

[viii] This interchange is adapted from C. John Sommerville, “The Exhaustion of Secularism,” The Chronicle Review (June 9, 2006)

[ix] Michael J. Perry, Under God? Religious Faith and Liberal Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 44. Nevertheless, Perry rightly argues that religiously grounded public discourse in a liberal democracy must be “deliberative,” not just “dogmatic.” That is, speakers must be willing to be criticized, to answer criticism, to deliberate and debate and seek to make one’s case as plausible to the other side as possible.

[x] See Perry’s Chapter 3: “Why Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality Is Not Illegitimate in a Liberal Democracy” in Under God? above.

[xi] See John Witte, Jr., “God’s Joust, God’s Justice: An Illustration from the History of Marriage Law,” in Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought, M. McConnell, R. Cochran, A. Carmella, eds. (Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 406–425.

[xii] Stanley Fish, “Our Faith in Letting It All Hang Out,” New York Times, February 12, 2006.